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Women in virtually every job category still make less than men.
Academia is no exception. This Article will explore some of the structur-
al explanations for this continued disparity and the continued resistance
to seriously confronting those structural barriers to equality. Using the
still-unfolding story of a charge of discrimination filed against a universi-
ty, this Article examines the script that has become all-too-familiar in
discussions about the gender pay gap, whether in academia or elsewhere.
The basic storyline in pay discrimination litigation is this: Evidence is
presented about he existence of a gap between men's earnings and
women's earnings. The response is that the numbers cannot be looked at
as a group because there are individual explanations for each pay deci-
sion. With this move, the focus of attention is shifted from an evaluation
of the troubling structural picture to an evaluation of an individual em-
ployee. Until we are willing to resist that shift, it will be nearly impossi-
ble to address the root causes of continued pay inequity.
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INTRODUCTION
Any gap in the pay of men and women, whether forty or ten or one
percent, is an implicit statement to our children that we value the
work of our daughters less than that of our sons.
-Dreves v. Hudson Group Retail, L.L. C.
Although it has been illegal to discriminate on the basis of sex in
setting pay for more than fifty years now, women in academia-like
women in virtually every job category-still make less than their male
counterparts. Discussions about why that pay gap persists tend to break
down into uncomfortable disagreements about whether it can best be
explained by lower performing or less ambitious women or by sexist
supervisors. In fact, the reasons for pay disparities rarely fit within either
narrative. Instead, continued pay inequity in academia is more plausibly
explained as a function of the structure of academic jobs and the highly
subjective ways that the academy has come to define merit. As in other
areas of discrimination, however, it is hard to keep the focus of the gen-
der pay gap debate on its structural causes. The pull of individual expla-
nation is overwhelming strong.
The pull of individual explanation is also, perhaps not surprisingly,
a central element of litigation over pay disparities, even when the claim
reveals structural disparities that seem to reach well beyond any individ-
ual employee's rate of pay. This Article will use the still-unfolding story
of a charge of discrimination filed against a university to examine the
script that has become all-too-familiar in discussions about the gender
pay gap, whether in academia or elsewhere. Here is the basic storyline:
Evidence is presented about the existence of a gap between men's earn-
ings and women's earnings. The response is that the numbers cannot be
looked at as a group because there are individual explanations for each
pay decision. What this script does is to shift the focus of attention
adroitly from an evaluation of the troubling structural picture to an eval-
uation of an individual employee-usually to the woman who has raised
concerns about the structural problem.
This Article will first tell the story of Professor Lucy Marsh's
charge of discrimination, filed against the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law in July 2013. It will then examine the ways in which the
circumstances that create pay disparity in academia are in fact structur-
al-even when they are described as individual. Finally, the Essay will
consider why the move from the systemic to the individual in the pay
discrimination narrative is so persistent-why do we continue to miss the
forest for the trees?
1. No. 2:iI-CV-4, 2013 WL 2634429, at *13 (D. Vt. June 12, 2013).
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I. PROFESSOR LUCY MARSH'S LAWSUIT
In July 2013, Professor Lucy Marsh, a forty-year veteran of the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law (DU Law), filed a charge of
employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).2 The charge alleges violations of both Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act (EPA), stemming
from the fact that Professor Marsh's salary is lower than those of her
male colleagues.3 In addition to challenging her own salary as discrimi-
natory, the charge filed by Professor Marsh observes that the gender pay
disparity at DU Law is systemic, stating that "female professors at the
Law School were discriminated against with respect o compensation
because of their gender, and were paid less than men performing substan-
tially equal work under similar conditions in the same establishment."
4
Professor Marsh's charge followed the circulation of a memo to the
DU Law faculty in December 2012 in which Dean Martin Katz ex-
plained a set of competitive merit raises he had recently awarded to top-
performing faculty members as a result of a university-wide initiative.5
After explaining the raises he did give, the dean went on to explain that
the funds for this round of raises were allocated "without regard to trying
to correct potential inequities."6 He did, however, look at the school's
salary structure "to see if there appeared to be any significant gender
disparities," and he found, among other things, that:
The median salary for female Full Professors was $7,532/year less
than that for males before this round of raises and $11,282/year less
than that for males after this round of raises. The mean salary for fe-
male Full Professors was $14,870/year less than that for males before
this round of raises and $15,859/year less than that for males after
this round of raises.
7
It was these numbers that prompted Professor Marsh to file her charge
with the EEOC.
Professor Marsh's discrimination claim garnered national attention
in part because it coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the enactment
of the EPA and the continued prevalence of gender pay disparity had
been a recently announced focus of concern for the EEOC.8 Among aca-
2. Colleen O'Connor, DU Professor Files Gender-Based Wage-Bias Case Against Law
School, DENV. POST, July 10, 2013, at 6A.
3. Id.
4. PROFESSOR LUCY MARSH: ATTACHMENT TO EEOC INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRE, available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/1 52792415/EEOC-addendum.
5. Memorandum from Martin Katz, Dean, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law, to the Facul-
ty of Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law: Faculty Salary Competitiveness Initiative (Dec. 13,
2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/l 52790023/DU-Faculty-Competitiveness.
6. Id. at3.
7. Id. at 3-4.
8. O'Connor, supra note 2.
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demics, her claim received attention as well because it told a familiar
story; the gender wage gap in academia is not unique to DU Law School.
A 2006 study of salaries by the American Association of University Pro-
fessors found that the average salary for female full professors was 88%
of male faculty members at the same rank.9 The wage gap across the
academic spectrum remains at about 81%, in large part because the ranks
of tenure-track and full professors are still dominated by men, while
women make up the majority of the lower status, untenured teaching
positions at universities.1°
Professor Marsh's case is also remarkably similar to other instances
of gender wage disparity in the way that her employer responded to evi-
dence of a gender wage gap. In his December 2012 memo to the faculty,
after reporting the median salary difference among full professors of over
$11,000 and mean salary difference of almost $16,000, Dean Katz as-
serted that "there is only so much that one can glean from looking at the-
se figures."'" These numbers have less meaning, according to the memo,
because:
there are at least three significant determinants of individual salary
differences: (1) differential starting salaries (accounting for teaching
and legal experience), as well as any special circumstances or deals
that may have affected that number, (2) differential merit raises, often
over many years, and (3) other circumstances in individual salary his-
tories, such as offers from other schools or lasting salary effects from
holding administrative positions. Accordingly, to determine whether
a salary gap reflects inequity requires an individualized analysis. 12
While the dean invited individual faculty members to talk with him if
they had concerns about the numbers his memo had revealed, he closed
by noting that "unless I have strong evidence to the contrary, I will need
to assume that all of my predecessors' merit raises were accurate reflec-
tions of performance." 13
Dean Katz's explanation does two things that are particularly nota-
ble. First, his response to the numbers he has just revealed shifts the fo-
cus of attention. The question that he asks us to focus on is not, Why is
the average salary among female professors at DU Law School nearly
$16,000 lower than that among their male colleagues? Instead, it is
whether Lucy Marsh-or any other female faculty member-is good
enough to be earning more. The consequences of that shift cannot be
9. MARTHA S. WEST & JOHN W. CURTIS, AAUP FACULTY GENDER EQUITY INDICATORS
2006, at 11 (2006), available at hup://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/63396944-44BE-4ABA-9815-
5792D93856F I/0/AAUPGenderEquitylndicators2006.pdf.
10. John W. Curtis, Faculty Salary Equity: Still a Gender Gap?, ON CAMPUS WITH WOMEN
(2010), http://www.aacu.org/ocww/volume39_ 1/feature.cfm?section=2.
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overstated. In addition to refocusing from the structural to the individual,
the dean's memo makes a starting assumption-that all past merit raises
accurately reflected performance-that itself rests on a necessary addi-
tional assumption that the gender pay disparity reflects a corresponding
gender performance disparity. Women have been paid less because they
have performed less well. Neither of these aspects of the memo is
unique. But the fact that this is how conversations about salary disparities
in academia tend to go does not mean that they should.
II. THE STRUCTURES THAT CONTRIBUTE TO GENDER PAY DISPARITY IN
ACADEMIC WORK
Much of the explanation for gender pay inequity in academia today
is structural, embedded within the assumptions that have come to define
merit and status in the academic job market. The mix of scholarship,
teaching, and service that generally defines the academic job privileges
scholarship significantly over the other facets of the job, but women are
more regularly pressed into additional teaching and service obligations.
Even within the broad categories of teaching, service, and scholarship,
women's work is systematically undervalued. While similar patterns of
gender stereotyping, segregation, and second tiering occur throughout the
academy, this discussion will focus specifically on women in legal aca-
demia. In doing so, it will draw from the work of other scholars who
have examined how law faculties reproduce gender stereotypes by focus-
ing "on those invisible law school structures and practices that have a
disparate effect on women faculty members."'4
Gender inequity in law school faculties, as in other parts of the
academy, begins with segregation and stratification. There are signifi-
cantly fewer women than men on the tenure track and it remains the case
that women are generally steered into lower status, lower security posi-
tions at law schools.15 The most recent data from the American Associa-
tion of Law Schools (AALS) show very slow increases in the number of
women faculty members in the most prestigious roles in law schools. In
the thirteen years between academic year 1995-1996 and academic year
2008-2009, the percentage of women full professors increased from
18.1% to just 29.9%. 6 During that same time period, the percentage of
14. Ann C. McGinley, Reproducing Gender on Law School Faculties, 2009 BYU L. REV. 99,
105.
15. Id. at 10 1-04; see also Marina Angel, Women Lawyers of All Colors Steered to Contin-
gent Positions in Law Schools and Law Firms, 26 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 169, 175-76 (2006);
Richard K. Neumann Jr., Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics Show, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC.
313, 314 (2000) (finding that "everywhere in legal education the line between the conventional
tenure track and the lesser forms of faculty employment has become a line of gender segregation").
16. see THE ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., AALS STATISTICAL REPORT ON LAW FACULTY (2000-
09), available at http://www.aals.org/resources_statistical.php (compare the data in Table 2A of the
2001-02 Report with the data in the Titles section of the 2008-09 Report); Paula A. Monopoli,
Gender and the Crisis in Legal Education: Remaking the Academy in Our Image, 2012 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1745, 1747.
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women law school deans went from 8.4% to 20.6%.'1 By contrast, in
2008-2009 the percentage of lecturers and instructors who were women
was 60.2 and 66.4% respectively, a drop of less than 10% in either cate-
gory from the 1995-1996 academic year.'8 Looking at the tenure track
itself, while the percentage of assistant professors who are women has
been nearly 50% (and higher in many years) since 1993, the percentage
of full professors who are women has yet to exceed 30%.19 Women who
start on the law school academic ladder don't stay on it or move up it at
the same rate that men do. This segregation and stratification is an im-
portant piece of the inequity puzzle, particularly in the ways that it rein-
forces stereotypes about gender and status.
Job segregation does not, however, explain the gender pay gap with-
in the rank of full professor at DU Law (and, no doubt, at other law
schools). This is an important point because job segregation is so often
identified as explaining wage disparity and as being a function of indi-
vidual men's and women's choices. Even putting to the side the ques-
tions about how freely these choices are made, choice cannot explain the
persistence of pay disparity. "Too often, both women and men dismiss
the pay gap as simply a matter of different choices, but even women who
make the same occupational choices that men make will not typically
end up with the same earnings.,,20 The explanations for wage disparities
between men and women within the same job category must be some-
thing other than job segregation.
At law schools accredited by the AALS, faculty members are sup-
posed to be evaluated based on scholarship, teaching, and service.21 At
most schools, the stated formula for evaluation is 40% scholarship, 40%
teaching, and 20% service. Conventional wisdom is that this formula
understates the importance of scholarship and overstates the importance
of both teaching and service to actual annual evaluations. Whatever the
actual formula might be, an overarching concern about evaluation in the
legal academy is that the job of law professor has come to be defined in
ways that demand more than full-time commitment and availability. In
this way, law schools-like law firms-are what organizational theorists
17. THE ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., supra note 16. In 2011, only 20.6% of law school deans
were women. ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN
THE LAW 2011, at 3 (2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/201 I/cwpcurrentglance statistics_20
I .authcheckdam.pdf.
18. THE ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., supra note 16. In 1995-1996, AALS categorized lecturers
and instructors as a single group, rather than dividing them into two distinct groups. During that
academic year, 70.8% of lecturers and instructors were female. Id.
19. Id. Note that this finding is based on the most recent data in the 2008-09 Report.
20. JUDY GOLDBERG DEY & CATHERINE HILL, AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC, FOUND.,
BEHIND THE PAY GAP 2-3 (2007), available at http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/Behind-the-Pay-
Gap.pdf.
21. THE ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., BYLAWS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS, INC. §§ 6-4, 6-6 (2008), available at http://www.aals.org/about handbook bylaws.php.
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,,22doraiainioedescribe as "gendered organizations. A gendered organization is one
"defined, conceptualized, and structured in ways that puts a premium on
masculine characteristics, including a willingness to work 'on demand,'
free from domestic responsibilities.23 When the demands of the organi-
zation put a premium on absolute availability, structural bias flowing
from these demands may call into question nominally neutral concep-
tions of merit. 24
While scholarly excellence sounds like a gender-neutral evaluation
criterion, there is much in the definition of scholarly excellence that fos-
ters or permits inequity. Several scholars have argued that the focus on
scholarship as the near exclusive measure of merit on law school facul-
ties has a disparate negative impact on women. In part, this may be
because the "trial period" of the scholarly track to tenure disadvantages
women because of its timing; most law professors are developing toward
tenure between twenty-seven and thirty-seven years old.26 This is also the
time in life when most women who are going to have families start those
families. The demands of scholarly productivity and the demands of
young children are at best inconsistent. As Paula Monopoli has recently
observed, these demands become even more unrealistic when scholarly
productivity is expected to be simultaneous with a regular schedule of
teaching and service.2 7
Moreover, excellence in scholarship is an extremely subjective
standard. Law schools often turn to publication venue as a proxy for ex-
cellence because of the difficulties with evaluating excellence in any
28other way. But the assumption that placement reflects merit is suspect
in a field where the vast majority of law reviews are run by and articles
selected by students with one or two years of legal studies. A 2010 study
of the authors published in the top law journals found "significant gender
disparity in publication" in these top journals.29 Scholarly excellence is
also defined, or significantly shaped, by the author's reputation in the
field.30 And reputation in the field, in turn, is shaped not only by the mer-
it of any individual piece of scholarship, but also by participation in con-
22. See Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, Navigating the Gap: Reflections on 20 Years
Researching Gender Disparities in the Legal Profession, 8 FIU L. REV. 515, 519 (2013).
23. Id.
24. Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations, 4 GENDER
& SOC'Y 139, 148-50 (1990).
25. See, e.g., Monopoli, supra note 16, at 1759-60.
26. McGinley, supra note 14, at 120-21.
27. Monopoli, supra note 16, at 1760.
28. Cf Deborah Jones Merritt, Research and Teaching on Law Faculties: An Empirical Ex-
ploration, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 765, 771 (1998) (using publication in a "top-twenty" journal as a
measure of the quality of an article).
29. Minna J. Kotkin, Of Authorship and Audacity: An Empirical Study of Gender Disparity
and Privilege in the "Top Ten" Law Reviews, 31 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 385, 386 (2010).
30. See, e.g., Christine Hurt & Tung Yin, Blogging While Untenured and Other Extreme
Sports, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1235, 1248 (2006) ("The goal of a junior professor who wishes to
advance in academia is to be recognized nationally as a capable scholar.")
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ferences and other forms of national outreach. The marketing time re-
quired to develop the "national reputation" that many schools now define
as the touchstone of scholarly excellence is significant. The explosion of
the blogosphere has only exacerbated these phenomena. Being visible on
the Internet has become an important part of developing a national repu-
tation but the time-consuming and time-sensitive nature of maintaining a
blog is hard to square with an effort to balance work and family com-
mitments.31 Unfortunately, the premium placed on being invited to, and
accepting invitations to, conferences around the country adds to the sub-
jectivity of the excellence measure, as conference organizers will tend to
invite the people they know and feel comfortable with. The extensive
scholarship on the risks of bias in systems built on subjective evaluation
has tended to focus more on evaluation internal to an organization,12 but
the same phenomena are at play with evaluations made across institu-
tions.
A willingness to be considered for lateral moves is also a significant
contributor to national reputation-and the existence of a lateral offer (or
even the possibility that one might be in the offing) is a common expla-
nation for salary differentials.33 But willingness to relocate continues to
be a gendered attribute, as women continue to be more constrained by
their partners' careers and their family obligations.34 In the absence of
significant social change, using this factor as either a measure of excel-
lence or as an independent salary variable will consistently and predicta-
bly disadvantage women.
Turning from scholarship to the less valued but still-required areas
of teaching and service, the evidence that bias infects evaluation and
work allocation in these areas is abundant. In terms of allocation of re-
sponsibilities, a number of studies have found that women in academia
spend more time on teaching and on service than their male counter-
31. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Tales of a Law Professor Lateral Nothing, 39 U. Mem. L. Rev.
125, 130-32 (2008) (discussing the importance of blogging to developing a national reputation and
getting noticed in the lateral hiring market).
32. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping
Research in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049, 1051 (1991); Tristin K.
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treat-
ment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 151-152 (2003); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Con-
tent of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Op-
portunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164-65 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, Comments on the Legal Education Cartel, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 25, 36 (2008) (discussing the need to increase a faculty member's salary in the face of com-
peting offers).
34. See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, What the Internet Age Means for Female Scholars, 116 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 46, 47 (2006) ("Start with a relatively uncontroversial premise. In American society,
women-including women employed full-time outside the home-still do far more 'care-taking'
than men. They do more housework, cook more meals, and spend more time caring for children.
Some men, of course, do more of these tasks than many women-but the average man does not.
Many professional men with children have wives who don't work outside the home, at least if there
are young children in the picture; meanwhile, very few working women, mothers or otherwise, have
husbands who don't work outside the home.").
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parts.35 And within each area, women often have to work harder than
men to be viewed as equally good. For example, studies have found that
women faculty members have to prove their competence in the class-
room more than men do.3 6 Other studies have demonstrated that female
faculty are segregated in lower-status course offerings.37 Women profes-
sors also often find themselves with busier office hours and more student
questions than their male counterparts.38
In the area of service work, female faculty again tend to get the
short end of the stick. As Nancy Levit has aptly described it, much of the
work that women are asked to do on law school faculties is the "house-
39work" of the institution. Women are more often asked to chair or serve
on the lower status committees that address student life and experiences
rather than on the more powerful committees such as appointments or
tenure and promotion.40 Even more disturbing is the possibility, suggest-
ed by Ann McGinley, that as women take on the more prestigious
roles- associate deanships or chairs of the once higher status commit-
tees-"[i]nternal work seems to be less important to the prestige of the
school and, concomitantly, to the career of the faculty member.,41 Ser-
vice work that once was important, and handled by male faculty mem-
bers, has become less important as women have broken into its ranks.42
Now even the once-important service work is left to women, leaving the
men free to focus on their own individual scholarship and the work of
developing the requisite national reputation through participation in con-
ferences and the Internet self-promotion that has become such a central
element of legal academic production.43
An over-arching challenge to all of these measures of evaluation-
scholarship, teaching, and service-is that excellence in each is hard to
35. John W. Curtis, Persistent Inequity: Gender and Academic Employment 5 (Apr. 11, 2011)
(unpublished report), available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/08E023AB-E6D8-4DBD-
99A0-24E5EB73A760/0/persistent inequity.pdf.
36. See, e.g., Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal Acade-
my, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333, 334 (1996); Deborah J. Merritt, Bias, the Brain, and Student
Evaluations of Teaching, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 235, 265-67 (2008).
37. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Rooms of Their Own: An Empirical Study of Occupa-
tional Segregation by Gender Among Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 293, 295-96 (2004);
Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About Affirma-
tive Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 258-273 (1997). When women teach in
lower-status areas, their scholarly production is likely also to be in those lower-status fields. This job
segregation may thus contribute to the challenges women face gaining national recognition as schol-
ars as well. Merritt & Reskin, supra, at 267.
38. See, e.g., Susan B. Apel, Gender and Invisible Work: Musings of a Woman Law Profes-
sor, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 993, 999-1000 (1997).
39. Nancy Levit, Keeping Feminism in Its Place: Sex Segregation and the Domestication of
Female Academics, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 777 (2001).
40. Id. at 786-87; see also Apel, supra note 38, at 1000-02.
41. McGinley, supra note 14, at 150; see Kristen Monroe et al., Gender Equality in Academ-
ia: Bad News from the Trenches, and Some Possible Solutions, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 215, 219-20
(2008).
42. McGinley, supra note 14, at 150-5 1.
43. Id.; see also Levit supra note 39, at 785-89.
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define without resorting to extremely subjective standards. And yet, the
more informal and subjective an evaluation system is, the more likely it
will be applied unevenly.44 This may be one piece of why, as one district
court recently recognized, "women who have earned professional de-
grees, work longer hours, or hold management positions are subject to•• , 45
some of the largest pay disparities. Academia, like many other fields
requiring professional degrees, has developed evaluation metrics that are
extremely difficult to standardize. An evaluation of whether these met-
rics are being applied correctly or fairly is consequently more difficult.
III. THE SHIFT FROM THE STRUCTURAL TO THE INDIVIDUAL
While these structural attributes of legal academia are very likely to
be major contributors to gender pay disparities, conversations about pay
inequity tend to move-like Dean Katz's memo-quickly to individual
explanations and a focus on what might explain why any individual fe-
male faculty member receives lower pay than her male peers.
A number of factors might explain this instinct to focus on the indi-
vidual, rather than the structural. First, the law that governs pay discrimi-
nation claims pushes to individual explanations. Second, for those inside
the structures of legal academia, it is uncomfortable to consider the im-
plications of structural biases. Solutions for these structural problems are
also not immediately apparent. It is easier to focus on individual employ-
ees, to look for the aberration, than it is to consider that the entire system
may be broken.
A. Legal Standards Push to the Individual Explanation
The law of pay discrimination has been written and interpreted to
favor the individual instead of the structural explanation for disparities.
Both the EPA and Title VII incorporate elements and defenses that focus
attention on specific employees and discrete employment decisions.
A prima facie case under the EPA requires a woman to prove that
she was paid differently from male employees for "equal work on jobs
the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility,,,• 46
and which are performed under similar working conditions. The de-
fendant is then able to respond with one of four statutorily defined af-
firmative defenses.47 Of the four, the one that is most common in aca-
demic settings is an argument that the differential is "based on any other
44. See, e.g., Sterling & Reichman, supra note 22, at 520-21.
45. Dreves v. Hudson Grp. Retail, L.L.C., No. 2: I-cv-4, 2013 WL 2634429, at *12 (D. Vt.
June 12, 2013); see also U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 1045: HIGHLIGHTS OF
WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN 2012, at 9, 11 (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom20l2.pdf
(showing an eamings ratio of 73% between women and men who have earned a bachelor's degree or
higher, and a pay ratio of 71.6% for women in management, professional, and related occupations).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012).
47. Id.
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factor other than sex."48 Both the prima facie case and the "factor other
than sex" defense result in extensive discussion of not only an individual
plaintiff, but also specifically identified opposite sex comparators, even
in instances where the challenged employment practices are structural.
Brock v. Georgia Southwestern College49 offers a particularly clear ex-
ample of this in the academic context. The Department of Labor (DOL)
brought this case as a result of its investigation into employment patterns
at the college, first among custodial employees and then within the facul-
ty ranks.50 While DOL challenged the college's hiring and pay-setting
practices at a structural level-arguing that the college's entire approach
to employment decision making was excessively subjective-the focus
of the court's decision is on six specific women and their specific com-
parators.5' The structural challenge is relegated to a footnote, as the
EPA's statutory requirements push the court into the one-to-one compar-
isons that dominate the opinion.
One of the most significant challenges of an EPA claim for an aca-
demic is that "plaintiffs in non-standardized jobs have a difficult time
showing that they can even compare themselves to their peers.52 Some
courts and commentators question whether the EPA even applies to jobs
in fields such as academia.53 The argument is that the statute was really
designed for standardized jobs in which it is evident that two people are
performing the "same" work. In academia, where professors do different
amounts of research and writing, teach different classes with different
numbers of students, and provide different services to the law school or
the legal community, it is hard to know whether two people can ever
reasonably be described as doing the same work. 4 This argument puts
48. Id. The other available defenses are the presence of a seniority system, a merit system, or
a system that "measures earnings by quantity or quality of production." Id.
49. 765 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1985).
50. Id. at 1029.
51. Id. at 1030-33 & 1030 n.6.
52. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act's Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L.
REV. 17, 31 (2010).
53. See id. at 39-41 (discussing the difficulties of applying the EPA to situations involving
professionals in high-level, non-standardized positions).
54. Cf Cullen v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 338 F.3d 693, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2003) (looking
behind nearly identical job titles to evaluate whether the particular circumstances of a female profes-
sor and her male comparator were different and concluding that their jobs were not the "same");
Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1452 (2d Cir. 1995) (highlighting that although plaintiff and
comparator were both assistant professors teaching biology, plaintiff had not established a prima
facie case under the EPA because, "at one point, [plaintiff] acknowledged that [comparator] had
responsibilities [plaintiff] did not share"); Strag v. Bd. of Trs., 55 F.3d 943, 950 (4th Cir. 1995)
(describing how the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the EPA because her pro-
posed comparator taught in the biology department, while she taught mathematics); Spaulding v.
Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that the nursing faculty at the univer-
sity failed to establish proof of sufficiently similar work when comparing nursing work to work in
other disciplines of the university), overruled by Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477
(9th Cir. 1987). See generally Ana M. Perez-Arrieta, Note, Defenses to Sex-Based Wage Discrimina-
tion Claims at Educational Institutions: Exploring "Equal Work" and "Any Other Factor Other
Than Sex" in the Faculty Context, 31 J.C. & U. L. 393, 399-403 (2005).
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too heavy a burden on plaintiffs.55 The better approach is to accept the
employer's job titles-Assistant Professor or Professor, for example-as
defining the job and leave questions about quantity or quality of work
actually performed as part of the employer's defense.56 Either way, how-
ever, the comparison of the plaintiff's work to the work of other identi-
fied employees directs attention to the individual faculty members and
away from the structures of the workplace and its system of evaluation.
For an academic plaintiff who makes out a prima facie case, she is
likely to face a relatively predictable set of "factor other than sex" af-
firmative defense arguments. Many of them, in fact, were included in
Dean Katz's memo to the DU Law faculty. In particular, "differential
starting salaries . . . [and] special circumstances or deals that may have
affected that number" and "other circumstances in individual salary his-
tories, such as offers from other schools" are two common explana-
tions-both in litigation and out-for pay disparities.57 These defenses
are most often discussed in terms of "market factors" in judicial opin-
ions, and many courts-though not all-have accepted the argument that
market factors can be the non-sex-based explanation for gender wage
disparities.58 The use of market factors to explain differential pay should,
however, be carefully examined. Insights from social science research
have taught us a great deal about the limits of the "market" as a neutral
source of information about men's and women's actual potential or per-
formance.59 Indeed, Nicole Porter and Jessica Vartanian recently argued
that "[p]rior salaries and outside competitive offers are not always neu-
tral; they are often tainted with bias, and we should eliminate the effect
of that bias by precluding employers from relying on these factors when
setting pay. 6 ° Some courts have similarly recognized the gender bias
that infects the market and have expressed reluctance to incorporate that
bias into the law.61 Even those courts, however, have ultimately allowed
55. It also seems to ignore the fact that, when Congress created exceptions to the Fair Labor
Standards Act for professional employees in 1972, the legislature specifically provided that profes-
sional employees remained protected by the EPA. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012).
56. See, e.g., Brock v. Ga. Sw. Coll., 765 F.2d 1026, 1033-34 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("We hold,
however, that plaintiff can meet its burden of going forward by showing that the teachers compared
are in the same discipline and that their job is to teach classes to students in that discipline. To re-
quire plaintiff to do more would be unrealistic, for it would require plaintiff to prove the absence of
any conceivable difference between teaching class X and teaching class Y, without defendant even
having to allege specific differences." (footnote omitted)).
57. See Katz, supra note 5, at 4.
58. See Perez-Arrieta, supra note 54, at 409-13 (collecting cases in which courts have consid-
ered such market forces as the basis for pay disparities).
59. Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay
Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 183-90 (2011).
60. Id. at 190.
61. See, e.g., Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 877 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982); Drum v.
Leeson Elec. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 & n.9 (W.D. Mo. 2008), rev'd, 565 F.3d 1071 (8th
Cir. 2009). But see Wernsing v. Dep't of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 470-71 (7th Cir. 2005) (con-
cluding that criticizing the market as being gender-biased will not defeat a defendant's reliance on
the market as a factor other than sex).
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the market arguments to shield defendants from liability without looking
too closely at the structural dynamics at play in that market.
62
A third element that the DU Law memo raised as an explanation for
the significant gender gap in full-professor salaries at the law school was
"differential merit raises.' 63 This is certainly among the most common
factors other than sex raised to explain pay disparities. 64 As discussed
above, however, a university's evaluation metrics and their application
may suffer from structural flaws that contribute significantly to salary
inequities.6 5 In Kovacevich v. Kent State University,66 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, recognizing this reality, reinstated a jury verdict be-
cause the appellate court concluded that the jury could reasonably have
been suspicious of a "merit award system [that] was driven largely by an
opaque, decision-making process at the administrative level . . . and re-
warded men disproportionately to women."67 The Kovacevich decision is
unique among reported appellate cases to acknowledge that a system
described by neutral qualities such as merit may nonetheless be applied
in ways that create sex-based disparities that violate the EPA.
Academic plaintiffs are not often successful in pursuing challenges
under the EPA. A 2010 study of federal appellate EPA cases found that
of the twenty-three such cases involving university professors, the plain-
tiffs lost 65% of the time, frequently at summary judgment.68 In these
cases, courts have tended to treat a university's evaluation of teaching
ability and scholarship, as well as the university assessment of market
demand, with a great deal of deference.69 Indeed, some courts view the
need for deference to universities to be even greater than the need for
deference to other employers because they see faculty hiring as tied di-
rectly to academic freedom, and academic freedom to the First Amend-
ment.70 As the First Circuit expressed it in an early EPA case:
62. For a remarkable exception to this general approach, see Dreves v. Hudson Grp. Retail,
L.L.C., No. 2:1 l-cv-4,2013 WL 2634429, at *13 (D. Vt. June 12, 2013).
63. See Katz, supra note 5, at 4.
64. See, e.g., Wu v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 1480, 1485 (11 th Cir. 1988).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 21-45.
66. 224 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2000).
67. Id. at 827. One of the things that made Kovacevich rather unique among EPA decisions is
that the appellate court had the benefit of a jury verdict to review; most EPA cases from academic
settings, despite the fact-driven nature of the EPA inquiry, have been dismissed by courts at sum-
mary judgment. Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 33-34.
68. See Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 33.
69. This deference to universities and its impact on the viability of discrimination claims in
academic institutions has been long recognized. See, e.g., Susan L. Pacholski, Title VII in the Uni-
versity: The Difference Academic Freedom Makes, 59 U. CHi. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (1992) ("Courts in
the United States have traditionally exercised restraint in cases involving the academic decisions of
colleges and universities."); Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to
Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 67, 69 (1994) (noting that "the federal courts have always
deferred to academic institutions and hesitated to scrutinize the faculty personnel process").
70. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. Of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("Our Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amend-
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A university is, of course, not free of the Equal Pay Act, but when
it is confronted with possibly opposing pressures or obligations,
some of which involve the difficult subject of gender, it must be al-
lowed substantial room to maneuver, rather than find itself between
the devil and the deep blue sea. Otherwise, instead of some measure
of academic freedom, it will face the constant prospect of judicial re-
proof.
71
The invocation of academic freedom as a barrier to judicial evaluation of
pay disparities risks insulating significant structural inequity from any
review in the academic setting. Together with a more general judicial
reluctance to look behind individual explanations for the structural caus-
es of disparity, this judicial deference to academic employers has made
the EPA a very tough path for women professors challenging pay inequi-
ties.
Pay discrimination claims can, of course, also be pursued through
the prohibitions against sex discrimination contained in Title VII. This
route presents a slightly different set of hurdles for plaintiffs challenging
gender-based pay disparities. While Title VII does not require that plain-
tiffs identify specific comparators performing similar work to pursue a
claim, a disparate treatment claim does demand that the plaintiff provide
sufficient evidence to suggest that the employer intentionally discrimi-
nated based on sex in making pay decisions. The focus on employer in-
tent operates in much the same way that the EPA requirements do, to
push parties and the court to individual explanations for decision making.
Moreover, Title VII specifically incorporates the affirmative defenses
contained in the EPA, so the "factor other than sex" analysis is effective-
ly the same under the two statutes. Ultimately, as Tristin Green has not-
ed, "[t]raditional disparate treatment theory conceptualizes discrimina-
tion as individual, measurable, and static. 72
Many scholars, including Green, have argued in recent years for ap-
plication of antidiscrimination laws in ways that recognize the structural
nature of discrimination and that shift focus away from the individual-
ized model to recognize and remedy systemic harms.73 This scholarly
push was paralleled during the 2000s by impact litigation efforts led by
national public interest law firms like Equal Rights Advocates and the
ment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."); J. Peter Byr-
ne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment", 99 YALE L.J. 251, 265-67
(1989).
71. Winkes v. Brown Univ., 747 F.2d 792, 797 (1 st Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted).
72. Green, supra note 32 at 112.
73. Id. at II1- 12; see also, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4-20 (2006); Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach
as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 850 (2007);
Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741,
767-88 (2005); Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-First Century Workplace:
Some Preliminary Observations, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639, 641-42 (1998).
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Impact Fund.74 These lawsuits, most famously the challenge mounted by
Betty Dukes and other plaintiffs against pay and promotion discrimina-
tion at Wal-Mart, challenged the excessively subjective, unguided deci-
sion-making policies that led to significant gender inequities at Wal-Mart
Stores all over the country.75 For many years, these suits seemed to be
making inroads into the individual-focused presumptions in discrimina-
tion liability. Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court's 2011 deci-
76sion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes made systemic challenges under
Title VII much more difficult precisely because of the Court's reluctance
to permit challenges that do not have "significant proof' linking com-
plained-of structural problems to individual decisions.77
B. Challenging Structure Is Hard
Even outside of litigation, discussions of pay equity tend to drift to
consideration of individual employees or decision makers. At bottom, it
is easier to talk about whether one person or another is making the right
amount of money than it is to talk about whether an entire system of
evaluation and pay setting is flawed.
Asserting that the structure of a job or a workplace is biased is rela-
tively easy from outside of that job or workplace. But making the same
claim from within is much harder. For law professors evaluating a gender
pay gap in legal academia, there is a natural push away from condemning
the system itself as biased. Social science research on "system justifica-
tion" demonstrates that both those who benefit from and those who are
harmed by implicit structural biases will take great pains to justify the
status quo of the systems within which they are operating.78 Part of the
challenge that contributes to system justification is that acknowledging
systemic flaws requires a person to then decide whether to address them
or ignore them. Neither choice is easy.
74. See generally Hart, supra note 73, at 778-88. As the Impact Fund explains on its website,
the Fund "maintains an active litigation docket in order to stay at the forefront of the class action and
collective action legal field and to demonstrate the means for using these legal mechanisms to
achieve broad social change." Litigation, IMPACT FUND, http://impactfund.org/litigation/ (last visited
July 18, 2014). Similarly, Equal Rights Advocates has "transformed the law for hundreds of thou-
sands of women and girls for over four decades through impact litigation, advice and counseling,
and policy reform." Fighting for Women's Equality, EQUAL RTS. ADVOCS.,
http://www.equalrights.org/our-work/ (last visited July 18, 2014). Interestingly, Equal Rights Advo-
cates has been working with Lucy Marsh on her dispute with the University of Denver. See Cynthia
Foster, Client Professor Lucy Marsh Called "Champion for Fair Pay" by Colorado Law Week,
EQUAL RTS. ADVOCS. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.equalrights.org/client-professor-lucy-marsh-called-
champion-for-fair-pay-by-colorado-law-week/; see also O'Connor, supra note 2.
75. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011); see also Melissa Hart,
Learning from Wal-Mart, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 355, 359-65 (2006).
76. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
77. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553-54 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of
Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 883 (2004) (em-
phasis omitted).
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Imagine you are a legal academic (if you are reading this law re-
view article, you probably are a legal academic): you have decided to
join a profession in which the metrics that are being used to define merit
include excellence in scholarship, teaching, and service. If you've been a
legal academic for any amount of time, you've been trying to write law
review articles, agonizing over which law journals accept or reject them,
worrying about whether your articles are cited in other articles, and
whether you are invited to national conferences, or asked to guest blog
on some much-read site or another. You've been working long hours to
succeed in these efforts, and we haven't even gotten to teaching or ser-
vice yet. If you open up the Pandora's Box of questions about whether
the system of evaluation that has pushed you to work so hard at these
things suffers from structural bias, you not only have to question what
you have been spending all of these hours doing, but you also have to
decide whether to keep doing it or to push for some different system. If
you have received positive feedback for your success within this system,
you would have to ask whether your success is truly meaningful if the
evaluation system is flawed. And even if you have not received the kind
of feedback you might have hoped for, you have still been striving within
this system, and rejecting or questioning it means questioning your own
choices.
Moreover, if you were to decide to push for a different system, it
isn't immediately obvious what that different system would be. Even in
the current climate of uncertainty for law schools and critique of legal
education, it is hard to find serious proposals for restructuring the current
system of responsibilities and rewards in legal academia. Paula Monopoli
recently made an interesting suggestion for decoupling productive teach-
ing years from productive scholarly years in recognition of how difficult
it is to do both things well simultaneously.79 The ABA Task Force on the
Future of Legal Education has gently suggested moving away from ten-
ure for law professors.80 Their concerns are not with gender pay equity,
but with the costs of legal education.81 It is possible, though, that a shift
away from a tenure system that privileges scholarship might have gen-
der-leveling effects. It seems equally likely that the job of law professor
in schools that adopt that regime will, much like the current positions of
instructor and lecturer, become sex-segregated with women dominating
the new, lower status field and men moving on to something else.
79. Monopoli, supra note 16, at 1764-74.
80. See ABA TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 7, 14-16, 31 (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professionalresponsibility/reportand_
recommendations of aba task force.authcheckdam.pdf.
81. Id. at 31 (discussing the tenure standards as standards that should be reevaluated in light
of their impact on the cost ofa JD education).
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The structural problems are equally difficult from the perspective of
a well-intentioned decision maker. DU Law's Dean Katz is, I believe,
just such a decision maker. Put yourself for a moment in his shoes.
You've looked at the spread of salaries for full professors, and you have
found that the median salary for female full professors is far below the
median salary for male full professors. What should you do?8 2 You could
decide to provide across-the-board increases for female faculty members
to address the disparity. That is what Virginia Commonwealth University
did in 1996.83 In response, male faculty members brought a lawsuit chal-
lenging the raises as sex discrimination.84 And litigation risk is not the
only reason that an across-the-board equity adjustment may not be the
best choice. At some point, focusing on the forest can lead one to ignore
the individual trees. What do you do about a hard-working, talented male
professor who will be leapt over in an across-the-board adjustment? It is
not difficult to see why a more nuanced approach to salary adjustment
would be appealing. And yet, if you decide not to do a uniform adjust-
ment, but to only adjust certain salaries, you are moving to individual
evaluation.
It is not entirely surprising that one of the common structural solu-
tions proposed to address gender pay gaps, in academia and elsewhere, is
a system of lockstep pay increases. The argument for lockstep pay rec-
ognizes that "[a]s long as salaries are determined primarily by private
individual negotiation or administrative discretion, inequities will
reemerge.,85 Lockstep salaries, set at years of service, avoid the subjec-
tivity of annual evaluations of merit. They also eliminate the salary ma-
neuvering that can occur with lateral offers, and the "special deals" made
at hiring. As a mechanism for salary equity, lockstep pay is pretty per-
fect. As a mechanism for job equity, it may not be. Lockstep pay ensures
that people are paid the same amount at each year of service. It does not
ensure that they work as hard. Before reformers embrace lockstep pay as
a solution to the pay equity problem, they should consider carefully what
inequities might unintentionally be created by such a system.
Most scholars who examine gender disparities among academics
emphasize the need for salary transparency as a first step to addressing
.86 11 -cieiti eadthese disparities. Professor Marsh's story is instructive in this regard.
82. In the months following his December 2012 memo to the faculty, Dean Katz hired a
consulting firm to conduct an equity study of salaries at the Law School to assess "whether there are
individual or structural factors that have contributed to pay distinctions on the basis of gender." E-
mail from Martin J. Katz, Dean, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law, to Denver Law Community
(Feb. 27, 2014, 2:26 PM) (on file with author). The results of that study will be released to the law
school, and it remains to be seen whether equity adjustments or other changes will occur.
83. See Smith v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 674-75 (4th Cir. 1996).
84. Id. at 674; see also Maitland v. Univ. of Minn., 155 F.3d 1013, 1015 (8th Cir. 1998) (male
professors brought a lawsuit arguing that implementation of a gender-based salary adjustment dis-
criminated against them).
85. Curtis, supra note 10.
86. See Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 63-64; Sterling & Reichman, supra note 22, at 518.
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While Marsh and other women had raised questions about whether there
was salary disparity at DU Law, the University of Denver is like most
private employers in maintaining secrecy about salaries.87 Only when the
dean of the law school, in an effort to be more transparent, circulated a
memo to the faculty identifying a significant difference in median pay
for male and female full professors did the possibility of a direct chal-
lenge to that disparity become evident.
There certainly may be benefits to transparency. One of the com-
mon explanations offered for pay disparities is that "[w]omen don't
ask. '88 Without transparency, however, it is at best complicated to place
the blame for disparity at the feet of those being paid less. "Unless wage
rates are published, women do not know what to demand."89 Thus, trans-
parency might encourage negotiation. Transparency might also encour-
age better behavior by schools, as decision makers will be called on to
articulate explanations for inequities. Transparency is also hard. When
colleagues are aware of who is being paid more and who is being paid
less, the opportunities for hurt feelings and anger are significant. Trans-
parency risks having a corrosive impact on workplace culture. The bene-
fits may outweigh those risks, but it is not immediately obvious that they
will.
IV. A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES
The fact that challenging structure is hard does not mean it
shouldn't be done. It might even mean just the opposite-we should be
challenging structure precisely because it is hard. To that end, perhaps
the most troubling line in Dean Katz's memo to the DU faculty is his
statement that "unless I have strong evidence to the contrary, I will need
to assume that all of my predecessors' merit raises were accurate reflec-
tions of performance."90 With that starting assumption, current salary
disparities are frozen in place as presumptively reflecting the relative
merit of the individual faculty members. Embedded in that assumption,
given the gender disparities in full professor salaries, seems to be a fur-
ther assumption that male faculty members are, on the whole, better per-
formers than female faculty members.
87. See, e.g., Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1044 &
n.1 (2012) (noting that studies show that most employees in the United States work for employers
who maintain salary confidentiality rules).
88. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: THE HIGH COST OF
AVOIDING NEGOTIATION-AND POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE ix-x (2007).
89. Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 65; see also Paula A. Monopoli, In a Different Voice: Les-
sons from Ledbetter, 34 J.C. & U.L. 555, 556-57 (2008) ("Any good negotiation relies in large part
on information .... Without reliable data on where one stands in the faculty array vis-A-vis male
colleagues, and with amorphous standards of merit that rule in the academy, women are at a signifi-
cant disadvantage.").
90. Katz, supra note 5, at 4.
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What would it look like to make a different assumption? What if a
dean, confronted with systemic gender disparities, were to assume in-
stead that these gender disparities would not have developed absent dis-
crimination in either the standards being applied or the way those stand-
ards are being applied? How would that starting point affect pay deci-
sions?
One principle that might be properly applied in such a circumstance
is "first, do no harm."91 Perhaps an employer who encounters a signifi-
cant gender pay disparity should be barred from offering raises that ex-
acerbate the disparity. Once a pay disparity, like that in the salaries of
full professors at DU Law, comes to light, available raise pools can only
be allocated in ways that either decrease or maintain the disparity. This
"do no harm" approach would be analogous to the three-part est applied
in evaluating claims under Title IX, which prohibits gender discrimina-
tion in funding for educational programs.92 In the Title IX context, a uni-
versity facing a challenge to its funding of athletic programs must show
either that it provides proportionate funding for male and female athletic
programs; that it is engaged in a "continuing practice of program expan-
sion" to meet the interests of the underrepresented sex; or that "it can be
demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex
have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present pro-
gram."93 The practical result of this test is that a university cannot make
an existing funding inequity worse. In order to demonstrate that it is
meeting one of the three requirements, the university will have to show
either that there is no existing inequity or that progress is being made
toward addressing an existing inequity.
Applied in the context of salary setting, this approach would allow a
decision maker tasked with offering merit raises, or competitive-salary
raises, to make the individual assessments necessary for that type of
raise. But it would also require that decision maker to acknowledge the
structural problem presented by the wage disparity-and to acknowledge
it as a structural problem, rather than simply as a series of individual
stories.
CONCLUSION
The frustrating persistence of gender pay inequity is a systemic
problem, and yet pay equity is just one of many employment contexts in
which structural causes are too often overlooked as discussion turns in-
stead to individual explanations. Unfortunately, the move from the struc-
91. This expression, from the Latin primum non nocere is a basic principle of bioethics. See
Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1226 (27th ed. 2000).
92. 20 U.S.C § 168 1(b) (2012).
93. 44 Fed. Reg. 71418 (Dec. 11, 1979); see also DEBORAH L. BRAKE, GETTING IN THE
GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN'S SPORTS REVOLUTION 62-82 (2010).
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tural to the individual significantly diminishes the likelihood of systemic
change. It is a move we can no longer afford.
